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CURTIS GARFIELD,
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:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah charged that defendant committed
the crime of a felony of the third degree by carrying a
concealed weapon, a firearm.

At arraignment, defendant

entered a plea of not guilty.

After plea bargaining,

defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a
plea of guilty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Based upon the guilty plea of defendant, the lower
court entered its Judgment that the defendant be confined

in the Utah State Prison for a term of not more than
five (5) years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, who appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his plea of guilty, seeks the reversal of his conviction, enforcement of his plea bargain
or the vacating of his sentence, as detailed in the Argument portion of this Brief.

In the alternative, and in

the event this Court concludes that the record herein
lacks facts essential to the proper and complete disposition of his case, defendant seeks remand to the District
Court for an evidentiary hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 8, 1975, defendant was charged by Complaint
filed in the City Court of Provo City, County of Utah,
State of Utah with committing the crime of a felony in
the third degree by carrying a concealed weapon, a firearm.

(R-38).

A preliminary hearing was held on July 31,

1975 and at the conclusion thereof, defendant was ordered
bound,over to the District Court for further proceedings.
(R-30).
On August 29, 1975 defendant was arraigned before
the District Court.

Defendant received a copy of the

Information (R-27), was advised of his rights and to the
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charges contained in the Information, defendant pleaded
not guilty.
jury.

Trial was set for October 20, 1975 with a

(R-26).
Between July 31, 1975 and October 21, 1975 defend-

ant's counsel had various plea bargain conversations
with the prosecutors and discussed defendant's problem
of alcoholism.

The prosecutors were informed that de-

fendant was an alcoholic undergoing treatment at Raleigh
Hills Hospital, 1255 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

(Transcript of Proceedings - 12, 18 and 19).

In

these conversations defendant's counsel urged that the
plea bargain be improved in view of defendant's alcoholism.

Defendant's counsel urged that defendant be

allowed to plea nolo contendere to a misdemeanor.

The

prosecutors responded that before a lesser charge would
be considered, a representative of Raleigh Hills Hospital
would have to convince the arresting officers that defendant was conscientiously seeking help and responding
favorably to treatment.

Conversations were subsequently

held between Scott U. Miller, a representative of Raleigh
Hills Hospital, and the arresting officers.
In a telephone conference held on October 20, 1975,
Carl J. Nemelka, one of the prosecutors, told defendant's
counsel that he could not reduce the charges against
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defendant but if defendant would enter a guilty plea,
the prosecutor's office would make a strong recommendation to the Court that defendant not be sentenced to
jail if he does not drink and continued treatment at
Raleigh Hills Hospital.

Mr. Nemelka acknowledged that

the recommendation of his office would not bind the
Court, but expressed his opinion that the Court would
not act contrary to such recommendation.

(Transcript

of Proceedings - 12).
In a conference held the following day, Mr. Nemelka
told defendant's counsel that if defendant would plead
guilty, he, Mr. Nemelka, would recommend probation and
that the Court xrould follow the recommendation.

Mr.

Nemelka stated that under the circumstances, the Court
would not want defendant to serve jail time if he refrained from drinking and would keep on the Raleigh Hills
Hospital program.

(Transcript of Proceedings - 18),

The assurances of the prosecutor were transmitted
to defendant by his counsel and based thereupon defendant
withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty
to the Information.

(Transcript of Proceedings - 19;

R-24).
Judgment was pronounced on November 21, 1975 by
Judge Maurice Harding.

Contrary to the assurance made
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by the prosecutor to defendant's counsel, the Court sentenced the defendant to serve not more than five (5)
years in the Utah State Prison.

Defendant's counsel,

thereupon, moved that the Court allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the plea was
entered by defendant based upon an assurance from the
prosecutor that if the defendant pleaded guilty, he
would be placed on probation.

The Court ordered that

the motion be held in abeyance until a transcript of
previous hearings could be prepared and allowed defendant to file his Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea in writing.

(Pv-23) . The Motion was filed by defendant on

December 18, 1975.

(R-15).

Defendant's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea was
argued before Judge Allen B. Sorensen on December 19,
1975.

The Motion was denied.

At that hearing the prosecutor acknowledged that
he had not, prior to the sentencing of defendant, recommended to the Court that defendant be placed on probation.

(Transcript of Proceedings - 13).

Defendant contends that the failure by the prosecutor to recommend to the Court that defendant be placed
on probation goes to the very heart of the plea bargain
and constitutes a ground upon which the Judgments of
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Judges Harding and Sorensen should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED TO RECOMMEND TO THE COURT
THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PLACED ON PROBATION AND DID
NOT DO SO
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of
guilty based upon the promise made by the prosecutor that
he would recommend to the Court that defendant serve no
jail time if he refrained from drinking and completed
the alcoholism program at Raleigh Hills Hospital.

There-

after, the prosecutor violated his promise by failing
to give the promised recommendation regarding defendant
to the Court. (Transcript of Proceedings - 13).
As a result of the failure of the prosecutor to
fulfill his commitment, defendant is entitled relief
under the authority of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), and United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d. 374
(4th Cir. 1974).

In both cited cases, convictions were

reversed because of the failure of the prosecutors to
adhere to their promises as to what they would recommend
at the time of sentencing.
In Santobello v. New York, a new prosecutor appar-
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ently ignorant of his predecessor's commitment to refrain
from making a sentencing recommendation, instead recommended the maximum sentence of one (1) year for defendant.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.

Mr. Chief

Justice Berger, writing for the majority, stated:
This phase of the process of criminal
justice and the adjudicative element
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,
must be attended by safeguards to insure
the defendant what is reasonably due in
the circumstances. Those circumstances
will vary, but a constant factor is that
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S.
at 262.
In United States v. Brown, the defendant entered into
a plea bargain whereby he pleaded guilty to the charge of
possession of stolen mail in consideration of dismissal
of a forgery charge and a recommendation by the Government that he receive a sentence of three years to be
served at Lorton concurrently with the unexpired portion
of another sentence.

He was, instead, sentenced to a

term of four years without recommendation that it be
served at Lorton.

At sentencing, a prosecutor other than

the one xvho entered into the plea bargain merely brought
the plea bargain to the attention of the Court but made
no recommendation as had been promised.
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The Court of

Appeals reversed on the ground that the "half-hearted" recommendation of the new prosecutor did not comply with
the plea bargain and that it made no difference that defense counsel had brought the reasons for the plea bargain
to the attention of the sentencing Court.

Holding that

the effect on the sentencing Court of the noncompliance
with the plea bargain was u a matter into which we need
not inquire,11 the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's recommendation.

Calling such action necessary for specific

enforcement of the plea bargain to which the defendant was
entitled, the Court wrote:
In determing the significance of the prosecutors failure to fulfill the promise contained
in the plea bargain in Santobello, the Supreme Court did not inquire into the reasons
for the breach; nor do we. We have no reason
to think that the bargain was breached as a
result of anything more than the failure of
the first prosecutor to inform the second,
and the second's complete candor in responding to the inquiry of the district court.
But in Santobello, hinging reversal on the
breach of the agreement alone, the Court attached no weight to the fact that the failure
to comply with the plea bargain had been inadvertent.
f,

The staff lawyers in the prosecutor's
office have the burden of 'letting
the left hand know what the right
hand is doing' or has done. That the
breach of agreement was inadvertent
does not lessen its impact." 404
U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
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The test established to be applied by us is thus
an objective one-whether the plea bargain agreement has been breached or not-irrespective
of prosecutorial motivations or justifications
for failure in performance. 500 F.2d at 378.
The failure by the prosecutor to recommend to the
Court that defendant be placed on probation prior to the
Court entering judgment on defendant here went to the very
heart of the plea bargain, namely that probation would be
recommended and that the recommendation of the prosecutor
would be accepted and enforced by the District Court.

In

this respect, the prosecutor's lapse was even more basic
than those in Santobello and Brown, which went to the content of the recommendation to the Court.

Therefore, the

defendant here is entitled to the relief ordered by Santobello and Brown.
POINT II
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO ACCEPT A
GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA BARGAIN AND THEN SENTENCE CONTRARY TO THE PLEA BARGAIN WITHOUT GIVING
DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
Defendant's counsel and the prosecutor engaged in negotiations culminating in a plea bargain whereby defendant
pleaded guilty to the Information.

Under these circum-

stances, the Court should have been advised of the plea
bargaining.

The Court would thereafter be obliged to

follow the prosecutor's recommendation or inform defendant
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that it would not do so and allow him an opportunity to
withdraw his plea.

The failure of the Court to permit

defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty requires this
Court to vacate defendant's sentence and remand the case
for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's recommendation.

See Santobello v. New York and United States

v. Brown.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CHANGE OF PLEA WAS BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES OF THE PROSECUTOR AND WAS, THEREFORE, NOT
VOLUNTARY
At the time that defendant withdrew his not guilty
plea and entered a plea of guilty, the Court asked the
defendant if he had been promised anything if he entered
a plea of guilty.

The Court also asked the defendant if

he understood that the Court was not bound by agreements
made between the prosecutor and defense counsel.

(Tran-

script of Proceedings - 5 and 6).
The ritual assertion by the Court below that it
was not bound by the plea bargain does not offset an
otherwise misleading impression.

This was the holding in

Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).

Walters, a petitioner under

28 U.S.C. §2255, claimed that he was induced into pleading
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guilty by the prosecutor's unkept promise that he would
receive a ten-year sentence and that he had been sentenced
to 20 years in prison instead.

This Court stated:

If Walters was in fact promised by the Assistant United States Attorney that he would receive a ten-year sentence, he is entitled to
relief. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d.
426 (4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Walters was
within the authority of no one but the trial
judge. An assurance by another that Walters
would receive a particular sentence, therefore, would be a promise that could not be
kept. An unkept bargain which has induced a
guilty plea is grounds for relief. Santobello
v. New York, 404, U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30
L.Ed 2d 42/ (1971). 460 F.2d at 991-92.
At arraignment, the trial court questioned Walters closely
as to whether anyone had made any promises to him.

The

Court then asked:
THE COURT: Do you fully understand that the
court, and the court alone, is responsible
under the law for any sentence that is imposed
upon a defendant who pleads guilty or if found
guilty, do you fully understand that?
DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir. Id. at 992.

As to the significance of the quoted question and answer,
this Court stated:
It is doubtful that the trial judge's instruction
that the length of Walters1 sentence was within
his sole control would have eradicated the effect
of the prosecutor's alleged promise to Walters.
Ibid.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
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for further factual inquiry by the District Court.

Rever-

sal is similarly required in the instant case.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS MISLEAD BY THE PROSECUTOR INTO BELIEVING
HIS PLEA BARGAIN WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defendant
was mislead by the prosecutor into believing that the Court
would accept his plea bargain.

The acts which mislead him

include the assurance from the prosecutor that under the
circumstances of this case, the Court would not want the
defendant to serve jail time. (Transcript of Proceedings 18) .
As a result of the misleading impression which was
conveyed to him, defendant entered his plea of guilty.

The

actions of the prosecutor require the specific enforcement
of defendant's plea bargain as set forth in Clemons v.
United States, 137 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943).

In demons,

the defendant was assured by an Assistant United States
Attorney that the indictment oh which he went to trial
charged only a misdemeanor and that the maximum sentence
was one (1) year.

The trial judge, however, construed the

indictment as charging a felony and, after conviction,
imposed a sentence of four (4) years.

On appeal, the Court

of Appeals held that the prosecutors assurances to the de~
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fendant as to the possible future punishment in the
event of conviction required reversal and, in addition,
rejected the Government's argument that the defendant was
not prejudiced since he was convicted after trial.

The

Court wrote:
It may well be that Clemons and his counsel acted
a bit precipitately in accepting this assurance
at its face value and in proceeding accordingly.
It does not follow that they, therefore, acted
altogether unreasonably. Certainly, the whole
procedure smacks of surprise, which should if
possible avoided.
A criminal trial is not, of course, to be likened
to a game....We think accordingly, that Clemons,
under the circumstances of this case, was deprived of his liberty against the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution of the United States, We think he
has been dealt with unfairly in the light of our
standards of justice towards those accused of
federal crimes - standards, in our opinion,
which the courts must always adequately safeguard and must, under all circumstances, zealously protect. 137 F.2d. at 305-306.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the errors commited below, defendant
respectfully submits that he is entitled to relief as
follows:
ERROR
I.

RELIEF

Failure of Prosecutor
to Recommend Probation
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Set aside defendant's guilty
plea and sentence; in the alternative, remand for an evidentiary hearing.

II. Failure to Sentence
Defendant in Accordance With Plea Bargain

Specific enforcement of plea
bargain; in the alternative,
remand for an evidentiary
hearing.

III. Defendant!s Change
of Pleas was Not Voluntary

Set aside defendant's guilty
plea and sentence; in the alternative remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS R. BLONQUIST
Second Floor
Metropolitan Law Building
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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